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SLEEPING ON THE JOB: THE IRISH FAILURE
TO RATIFY THE TREATY OF NICE

MArrHEwC JENNEJOHN

The fondamental misperception among the central decision-making group prevented the Irish government from
appropriately counteracting the Nice opposition campaign. Government structure, cultural preferences, and leadership personality are the key foctors contributing to the administration's misestimation of both the opposition and
its own efficacy. The results not only explain a watershed event in EU development but also prescribe specific policy principles ofEU enlargement to continue. Special emphasis is placed on the study's ramifications for the intergovernmental model for EU policy-making. The writer wishes to thank Dr. Valerie Hudson and Dr. Wilde Jacoby
of Brigham Young University and Dr. Michael Young of Ohio State University for their contributions to
this article.
SLEEPING THROUGH THE "CHOICE
FOR EUROPE"

It was a very quiet day yesterday for the 14 people

sitting behind polling tables in Neilstown National
School, Co Dublin. By 5:20 p.m. just 5.4 per cent
of the 4,350 voters had dropped by. Polling officers
looked bored, having lost interest hours earlier in
the books they brought, or the small talk their tablepartner had to offer. Well-used word puzzle books
lay around. And the electorate [was] just as bored.
(Ni Cheallaigh, 2001)

Upon the close of the lackadaisical Irish
polls on 7 June 2001, I all of the late-night
bickering among European Union (EU) members at Nice the previous December suddenly
appeared in vain. With 54% of voters refusing to
ratifY the Treaty of Nice, the Irish electorate
aborted the institutional reforms codified within
the Treaty that are necessary for the European

Union's expansion into Central and Eastern
Europe. 2 The Treaty implements controversial
and painful reforms in Union decision-making
and budget policy in order to accommodate an
expansion that adds twelve governments to the
administrative structure, increases EU population by over 25%, and yet only augments EU
GDP by 5%.\ The Treaty's implementation is
the last step in a decade-long process to fully
integrate the former communist countries into
a democratic Europe. However, by halting the
requisite reforms, the Irish referendum jeopardized this historic EU expansion if not frustrated
it all together (Kaminski 2001).

WHY?
Perplexity crept through the whole of
Europe and, ironically, through the administration of Irish Prime Minister Bertie Ahern following the referendum. Why did the Irish,
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having ratified the previous treaty on European
enlargement (the Treaty of Amsterdam) in 1998,
refuse the Treaty of Nice in 2001? This question
is especially puzzling considering Ireland's historically supportive electorate and foreign policy
behavior.4 While the role of the "No to Nice"
opposition campaign is clear in the Treaty rejection, the source of its efficacy is not. How could
an opposition campaign orchestrated by electoral
starvelings wrest victory from the hands of the
entire Irish political center?1 Why did the Nice
supporters, most notably the government, run
such an ineffective, half-hearted campaign for
Nice ratification? Lastly, both participants and
observers asked the most crucial of all: So what
happens now?
In hopes of eventually approaching this last
question, this case study begins by tackling the
first: Why did the Irish, having ratified the Treaty
of Amsterdam in 1998, reverse their EU policy
and refuse the Treaty of Nice in 2001? As we shall
see, changes occurring between 1998 and 2001
among those parties opposing EU expansion
account for the Irish policy reversal. However,
although the opposition parties were galvanized
by 2001, these changes still do not explain how a
coalition of parties controlling no more than 5%
to 7% of the electorate was able to undermine
the will of Ireland's major center parties." Thus,
understanding the Nice "yes" campaign is this
study's central puzzle: if they were committed to
the Treaty's ratification and also had the ability
to appropriately counteract the opposition, why
did the Nice supporters run such an impotent
campaignrWhy were they caught sleeping?
Two SFDATIVES AND A TRFACHFROUS PERsoNALITY

I argue that a conflation of governmental,
cultural, and personality factors caused the
Ahern administration to misestimate both its
opponents' and its own efficacy. While the fundamental source of the administration's misperception is found in Ahern's own personality,
government structure and cultural preferences
provided the conditions (the "sedatives") necessary for Ahern's personality to be influential.
Because of his misestimation, Ahern failed to
muster a sufficient counterattack against the Nice
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referendum opposition, thus allowing the "no"
campaign to seize victory.
This rather holistic argument takes issue
with the conventional wisdom regarding the
poorly executed "yes" campaign. Typical explanations of "yes" impotency claim that considerations
for the upcoming 2002 elections prevented Nice
supporters from spending sufficient campaign
funds to win ratification: "Facing the prospect of
an election in 200112002, the political parties
were loath to use scarce financial resources on the
Nice campaign as there is no state funding of
political parties in Ireland" (Laffan 2001, 2).
I find such explanations wanting in three respects.
First, the Nice opposition parties must also
budget for the 2002 elections-why could they
afford to break the bank over Nice while the
flush center parties could not? Second, successfully campaigning for Nice arguably does not
require much money: with 59% of the population supporting enlargement (Special 2001) and
over 50% of the population attributing their
decision not to vote simply to their inability to
understand the Treaty's intent and content (Peel
2001), successful ratification demands no more
money than what is needed to translate clearly
the purpose of the Treaty to the public. Since the
"no" campaign communicated their translation
of the Treaty primarily through posters and
television/radio invites (to which the "yes" campaigners were invited also), it follows that successful campaigning was possible for a minimal
price." Third, for no cost to the "yes" campaign,
other EU members campaigned among the Irish
voters to ratify the treaty (e.g., Germany's
Joschka Fischer gave rallies in Dublin urging
ratification) (de Breadun and Staunton 2001).
Yet, outside contributions still didn't turn the
tide of favor. "The 'no' campaign won the battle
of language" (Laffan 2001, 3), not the battle of
the war chest. Thus, the "yes" campaign suffered
less for a lack of funds than for a lack of vision
(Holland 2001 and Laffan 2001, 3).

So WHAT?
This article makes three contributions to
foreign policy-making and political analysis.
First, this explanation might grant policy-makers
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critical insight into gaining public support for
pro-EU legislation in an increasingly technical
and "democratically deficient" European Union.
Second, this study provides an explanation for a
watershed event in EU history-obviously, if we
understand why the Irish rejected Nice, we
might determine whether this obstacle to EU
enlargement is surmountable or not. Third, this
study introduces an important caveat to liberal
intergovernmentalism's model of EU policymaking:' The Irish case shows that understanding the impact of government structure, cultural
preferences, and personality allows us to better
apply the intergovernmentalist model to policy
scenarios. Hence, the relevance of this study is
founded upon both practical and theoretical
applications. Considering the unprecedented
crossroads at which the EU now stands-the
common currency came into full effect at
the beginning of the year, a common defense
force will soon be a functioning reality, the
Union is set to nearly double its size to 27 members within 10 years, and institutional reforms
are, arguably, creating a more federalist future for
Europe-these contributions to understanding
current and future European political phenomena are valuable indeed.
After introducing Irish domestic politics
and outlining how the Nice opposition managed
to deny the EU of ratification, I will present the
three major factors contributing to the Ahern
administration's mistake. First, I will discuss the
impact of government structure upon the administration's decision-making. Second, I will
treat the role of Irish culture in the administration's decision-making. As will be shown, these
two factors funnel decision-making power away
from organizational and bureaucratic processes
to the taoiseach (the Irish word for Prime Minister) himself Thus, the third major factor contributing to the Irish government's misestimation
of the Nice situation is the personality and perception of Bertie Ahern himself

produced a robust anti-enlargement campaign in
2001. The nature of the Irish political system
provides the motivation and means for opposition movements, such as "No to Nice," to
emerge. With the necessary systemic condition
provided, changes in the opposition party fortunes between 1998 and 2001 allowed these
parties to take advantage of the opportunity Nice
offered.
Means and Motive. For the focus of this
article, the ramifications of proportional representation and coalition government are the most
important aspects of Irish politics to be considered. While a full description of the unique Irish
proportional voting scheme will be provided
later, it suffices now to simply point out that proportional representation (PR), unlike a majoritarian system, allows for small party existence.
Additionally, coalition government provides
small parties an access to power; a major party
often needs only a small party to create a governing coalition. For instance, under Ahern,
Fianna Fail joined with the Progressive Democrats (a smaller party harvesting only 8% of the
vote on average) to form the current coalition.
PR and coalition government, thus, grant small
parties both the means and the motives for
"rocking the boat" in hopes of gaining an inroad
to governance.
The Nice Treaty referendum provided such
an inroad for two of Ireland's smallest, though
increasingly potent, parties: Sinn Fein and the
Green Party. Looking for an opportunity to legitimize their participation in the mainstream political debates (Financial Times 2001), these
opposition parties found Nice an ideal sticking
point. In the words of one Sinn Fein committee
member, "It's given us new credibility. People are
beginning to think that if there were more Sinn
Fein TDs and they played a bigger role, then
what would that role be? It is an excellent chance
for us to explain" (ibid.).10 An exchange between
Ahern and Gerry Adams, the Sinn Fein leader,
illustrates the same opportunism:

IRISH DOMESTIC POLITICS DURING NICE
RATIFICATION: AHERN'S RUDE AWAKENING

The Taoiseach, Mr. Ahern, met the Sinn Fein presi-

Irish domestic politics and internal changes
within the parties opposing the Nice Treaty

him why the parry was urging a "No" vote. Shrug-

dent, Mr. Adams, early in the campaign and asked
ging his shoulders on the staircase of Government
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Buildings, Mr. Adams looked up and smiled: "Can
you think of a better way of getting publicity?" (Ibid)

Thus, the Nice referendum offered these parties
a cheap and effective means of getting a foot in
the door before the next round of elections.
Internal Galvanization. Changes in the
opposition parties' respective political situations
also account for the Irish policy reversal between
Amsterdam and Nice. 11 Until the Good Friday
Agreement of 1999, Sinn Fein was still enmeshed with an armed and mobilized IRA.
Competing in the typical debates and machinations of a liberal democracy (e.g., arguing against
Nice to boost electoral prospects) was out of
question for a Sinn Fein that was still directly
associated with terrorism. Once the Good Friday
Agreement passed, however, Sinn Fein was freer
to reconstruct a new image for itself The other
major opposition party, the Greens, didn't factor
into the Amsterdam decision simply because
they didn't exist in any significant numbers at the
time (the Greens were first established in Ireland
around 1996). After three years of consolidating
support on campuses and organizing among the
electorate, the Green Party finally had the political clout (and it was still little at that) to affect
major national debates. Therefore, with both
major opposition parties unable to mount an
attack on EU enlargement in 1997-98, ratification of Amsterdam proved an easy measure. The
parties' different political fortunes three years
later made Nice ratification more uncertain.
Thus, the power of domestic politics is evident in the Irish case. By failing to appropriately
manage the domestic game, to use Putnam's
metaphor (1988), the Irish decision-makers
allowed themselves to be acted upon. The opposition parties had their victory, Ahern had the
proverbial foot in mouth, and the EU still didn't
have a binding treaty. Why did Ahern fail to
oppose "No to Nice"?
GOVERNMENT STRUCTURE: SEDATIVE ONE

Ireland employs a unique "proportional
representation-single transferable vote" system (PR-STY or simply STY).12 This peculiar
electoral scheme, along with the institutional
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character it gives the Irish government, provides
the fundamental environment necessary for
personality and perception, the most defining
characteristics of Irish decision-making, to affect
government foreign policy. The structure of the
Irish government subtly yet powerfully impacts
Irish foreign policy decision-making. Specifically,
the PR-STY scheme, in cultivating personality
politics, magnifies the depth of personality's effect
on policy-making, while the method of cabinet
formation and functioning, in allowing much
leadership autonomy, compounds the breadth of
personality's effect on policy-making.
The Effects of PR-STV. While the PR
nature of the system creates the sufficient conditions for multiple parties and thus coalition government, the single transferable vote option, by
allowing voters to put down their second and
third preferences should their first option lose,
fosters constituency politics. STY provides the
Irish voter with the opportunity to compare
competing candidates on individual rather than
party criteria and forces the Irish politician to
engage his/her constituency on a personal level;
the high level of proportionality reinforces the
importance of constituency politics in Ireland.
The intimacy between candidate and voter in
constituent politics, often founded upon a perception of friendship, establishes the primacy of
personality considerations in electing officials.
In that "ranking a set of candidates according to one's preferences" (Sinnott 1995, 104-5)
is the central logic of the STY vote scheme, a
candidate's image compared to his/her competitors' assumes paramount importance. Were Ireland to use the list scheme like other PR regimes,
where voters simply vote for a comprehensive
party ticket rather than for individual candidates, party loyalties would trump individual
candidates' characteristics. The party would
overshadow and subsume the unique character,
promises, plans, and ideologies of the individual
candidates. However, by not using such a list system, the Irish Constitution provides for the separate consideration of each candidate.
While not using a list scheme provides for
individual candidate relevance and introduces
candidate comparison to Irish voting, STY further magnifies the importance of comparative
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differences. Unlike majority/plurality systems
(e.g., the United Kingdom or the United States),
where the crucial battles are fought among the
"swing voters," the STV system forces politicians
to campaign equally among all constituents.
While swaying the fence sitters is still important,
it is also important for a politician to campaign
among his/her opponents' core supporters since
they may make him/her their second preference.
To illustrate the relevance of second and third
preferences, the results of the 1990 Irish Presidential election are provided below: l'
<-undidute

First

iramjer oj

Second C ount

l'refCrences

Curries Votes

Result

Austin

267,902

-267,902

Lenihan, Brian

694,484

~urrie,

+36,789

731,273

Robinson, Mary 612,265

+205,565

817,830

Non trmsferable

+25,548

25,548

papers
Valid votes: 1,574,651. Quota: 787,326

Figure 1. Results of the 1990 Irish Presidential election

Were it not for the second preference votes
transferred from Austin Currie to Mary Robinson (votes are transferred when none of the candidates reach the election quota upon the first
count), Brian Lenihan would have won the Presidency. The second preference votes were so crucial that, had she not campaigned among
Currie's supporters, Robinson would have lost
the Presidency. Thus, with a nonlist voting
scheme and the need to campaign among all
district voters, a broad relationship is forged
between politicians and citizens.
The Irish constitution's limits on district
SIze deepen the already broad politiClanconstituent relationship provided by STY.
District size must be no larger than 30,000 constituents per parliament member and no smaller
than 20,000 per member (Chubb 1992, 134).
Historically, district SIze has hovered around
21,000 constituents ever since the advent of the
republic in the early 1920s (ibid.). The expectations of the Irish voters further deepen this relationship. A poll conducted in 1989 measunng
"the most important criterion determining [the
Irish voters] vote" found "choosing a [parliament
member] who will look after the local needs of

the constituency" to be by far the most critical
consideration for the Irish voter, with 40% of the
participants placing it first (Chubb 1992, 144).
"Choosing a taoiseach," "choosing ministers who
will form a government," and "choosing a [parliament member] who will perform well on
national issues in the [Parliament)" were placed
as first considerations by only 14%, 9%, and
15% of the poll participants respectively (ibid.).
Thus, small districts allow for close politicianconstituent contact, while voter expectations
demand it.
Proportionality/disproportionality is "measured by comparing parties' shares of the votes
with their shares of the seats and noting the discrepancies" (Sinnott 1999, 113). "PR-STV in
Ireland delivers a high degree of proportionality,
virtually as high as that produced by electoral
systems that have the achievement of proportionality as their sole aim" (Sinnott 1995, 115).
As a practical matter for the Irish politician, high
proportionality means that voters' preferences
are efficiently translated in elections. Subsequently, the politician must actively maintain the
broad, deep relationship created by PR-STV or
else face negative results from a disenchanted
electorate.
The primacy of personality, caused by the
nature of STY, small districts, voter expectations,
and high proportionality combine to make the
personality and perception of the taoiseach
the most important influences on Irish foreign
policy decision-making. The relative power and
autonomy of the office of taoiseach make this
combination possible.

The Efficts of Irish Cabinet Formation/
Functioning. While coalition government often
disperses decision-making power among many, it
provides no such service in Ahern's administration. The insignificant number of Progressive
Democrats serving in ministerial posts (only one
Minister and two Deputy-Ministers) allows for
Fianna Fiil domination in group deliberation.
With the central decision-making group ideologically homogenous, the necessary conditions
for "groupthink" exist within the Irish cabinet
(Janis 1982, 174). Thus, Irish government structure provides the Prime Minister with a large
amount of autonomy. Also, as will be discussed
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later, certain cultural preferences predispose the
Irish to groupthink situations. With groupthink
"pressures toward uniformity" (Janis 1982,
175) silencing possible detractors to the
taoiseach's policy-preferences, the taoiseach's
personality and perceptions enjoy a wide range
of influence.
The Prime Minister's autonomy allows
him/her to transcend the group in making decisions. "The taoiseach is usually considered to be
one of the strongest of all heads of government"
(Elgie 1999, 237). The norms of Irish cabinet
interplay provide the taoiseach with most of this
decision-making power: "The taoiseach determines the order in which items on the cabinet
agenda are taken, the time given to consideration
of each item, who is to speak, and when a decision should be reached-or postponed.... In
practice, ministers do not challenge the
taoiseach's control of the agenda" (Farrell 1971,
176). In addition to agenda control, the
taoiseach enjoys pervasive influence in the entire
decision-making process:- "the Taoiseach is in a
position to direct rather than simply manage the
flow of governmental business and is thus able to
follow the full course of policy making from
inception through to approval at the cabinet
level" (Elgie 1999, 239). Thus, institutional
norms allow the taoiseach considerable autonomy in the decision-making process; if he/she
desires to, the taoiseach may transcend the Cabinet and make unilateral decisions.
The tao is each's previous experience in government grants him/her the ability to take
advantage of these norms and transcend his cabinet as such. History bears out that prime ministers typically have extensive experience in
previous governments. For instance, Bertie
Ahern, previous to his tenure as Prime Minister,
served as the Assistant Government Whip, Chief
Government Whip, Minister for Labour, and
Finance Minister. Therefore, Ahern, serving in
several previous governments, has necessary acumen to forsake consulting his Cabinet on crucial
decisions.
With institutionally granted autonomy
and the ability or power to take advantage of that
autonomy, the Prime Minister is the key, almost
sole, decision-maker in Irish foreign policy. We
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may look at these two factors as the necessary
conditions for taoiseach personality and perception to significantly influence foreign policy. If
those are the necessary conditions, then the pervasiveness of personality politics, as described
earlier, provides the sufficient condition. The
primacy of personality created by the small districts' constituency politics does not dwindle
with becoming Prime Minister: first, as mentioned before, no real structures exist to constrain elite personality; and second, the Prime
Minister, as a continuing member of Parliament,
is still beholden to his district constituency.
Thus, we would expect that any irrational outcomes in Irish foreign policy decision-making
could most probably be explained by the unique
personality and perceptions of the Irish Prime
Minister.
CULTURE: SEDATIVE

Two

Culture has a glacial influence on foreign
policy decision-making; its effect on the political
environment is deep and lasting. However, inasmuch as it carves out the canyons and moraines
of the national psyche over a long period of time
and over a broad horizon, culture's influence is
difficult to pinpoint. As Vertzberger points out,
"societal factors are less apparent to the observer"
(Vertzberger 1991, 260). In the Irish case at least,
culture does not explicitly cause, per se, any foreign policy outcomes. However, like Ireland's
governmental structure, Ireland's culture contributes to isolating decision-making power in
the hands of the taoiseach.
In identifYing causality, following Hudson's
prescription for examining cultural "value preferences" (Hudson 1997, 8-9), I will employ
Vertzberger's theoretical framework for culturedecision interaction. Vertzberger outlines four
ways that culture (or "societal attributes") affects
leaders' decision-making:
First, [societal attributes] affect the weight attached
to foreign policy issues compared to other issues on

the decision-makers' agenda and hence affect the
allocation of attention to and cognizance of foreignpolicy-related information. Second, once information has been recognized and has gained attention,
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societal factors may impinge on the assessment of the
importance of a particular datum and its diagnostic
value. Third, societal attributes may influence the
open-mindedness of decision-makers to dissonant
information and their preparedness to readjust existing definitions of the situation in the light of
new information. Finally, their attributes affect the
interpretation of available information and the
choice among competing interpretations. (1991,
261)

In other words, culture can affect policy by
influencing decision-makers' priorities, by favoring particular sets of data, by further dosing or
opening decision-makers' minds, and by biasing
certain interpretations at the expense of others. I
will discuss the special importance of culture
affecting policy in Vertzberger's ways one and
four. Culture affects the Irish decision on
enlargement the most by influencing decisionmaker priorities and by biasing decision-makers'
interpretations.
Hofstede identifies four cultural preference
continua influential to foreign policy decisionmaking: one, individualism v. collectivism; two,
strong v. weak gender differentiation; three,
small v. large power distances; and four, low v.
high uncertainty avoidance. I; Like values, preferences also provide a framework for decisionmaking. The natural preferences of a culture
predispose decision-makers to particular types of
action. For example, as Hofstede notes, cultures
that prefer individualism to collectivism value
personal achievement more than group harmony. These preferences affect decision-making
by prescribing certain action. For instance, the
subordination of group harmony to individual
achievement invites debate into decisionmaking, thus undermining one of the causes of
groupthink (Janis 1982, 37-9). The particular
preferences of Irish culture hampered the
Administration's ability to counter "No to Nice"
because they fostered groupthink.
Irish culture, generally speaking, lends decision-makers to prefer collectivism to individualism, weak gender differentiation, and small power
distance. I) The Irish preference for collectivism is
evidenced in the importance of relationships
among Irish politicians'" (for instance, Ahern's

chief Cabinet Members and political counselors
are his boyhood friends), the resolution of conflict
through bargaining (such as, leadership successions in the Fianna Fail party involve negotiations
between the party elite), and the familial relationships between superordinates and subordinates in
Irish politics (e.g., Charles Haughey, former
Prime Minister and Bertie Ahern's political mentor, aided Ahern throughout his career after meeting fourteen-year-old Ahern at a local canvassing
board). Irish decision-makers also prefer a weak
gender differentiation: for example, the two
Presidents of the 1990s were women and recent
legislation modernized Irish gender law (Finnegan
and McCarron 2000, 183-8). Also, Irish culture
prefers a small power distance of which the following organizational chart provides an example l7
(notice the lack of extensive hierarchy-e.g., the
Prime Minister's office is organized not above
the other Ministries but as just another cog in the
government's wheel):

He.dh

El'lerq

C'efe:l)se

Justice

EducatIOn

Labor

En . . lfon,

FOIl!lqr"!

p. 24 Barrington 1980
Figure 2. Irish executive branch organizational chart

The cultural preferences of Ireland identified using Hofstede's criteria contribute to the
Administration's failure to meet the opposition's
threat. The preferences for collectivism, weak
gender differentiation, and small power distance,
provide an ideal groupthink 18 environment by
lending the Irish decision-makers to seek consensus, resolve conflict while retaining group
harmony, and maintain low levels of centralization. With group members prizing relationships
over tasks and group harmony over dissention,
the autonomous taoiseach enjoys almost total
group loyalty in making a decision. Therefore,
when Ahern made the decision to disregard the
"No to Nice" campaign, other Cabinet Members
felt comfortable with simply jumping on the
bandwagon.
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ET TO BERTIE? AHERN
AS HIS

OwN WORST ENEMY

With government sttucture and culture
funneling decision-making power almost
entirely into the taoiseach, the unique personality and perceptions of Bertie Ahern determined
the Administration's approach to the Nice opposition. As outlined above, the structure of the
Irish Execurive and the nature of Irish constituent politics allow for the individual leader's
personality and perceptions to playa significant
role. Cultural preferences incubated the central
decision-making group in a groupthink environment-those that might have raised alternative
policies deferred to the taoiseach. Both his personality trait of confidence and his perception of
the opposition's strength factored heavily into
Ahern's decision-making regarding the Nice
"yes" campaign. 19
I argue that Ahern was aware of the growth
in opposition from Amsterdam to Nice but had
an attitude that undercut an appropriate counter
attack. That Ahern recognized the strength of
the opposition is reflected in comments such as
"[the previous referendums on the EU] all passed
comfortably, even if the margin of success had
been gradually declining" (Ahern 2000). Ahern
was aware of the growing opposition to EU
enlargement. Also, with the major parties outlining their stances on the Nice Treaty months
before the referendum in June, it would have
been nearly impossible for an astute politician to
fail to recognize the existence of an opposition.
Ahern's attitude affected decision-making
in two respects. First, Ahern's attitude led him to
be overconfident in the situation and abilities of
his administration. Second, Ahern's attitude led
him to misperceive the abilities of his opposition. Thus, Ahern's attitude squandered any
value brought by recognizing opposition growth
after Amsterdam. In the words of Brigid Laffan,
"The performance of the Government was particularly lacklustre as it appeared to take the outcome for granted" (Laffan 2001, 3).
A content analysis of speeches given by
Ahern from the beginning of 1999 to July 2001
reveals Ahern's steadily swelling self-confidence. I
followed a simple three-step process in measuring
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Ahern's confidence levels. First, I coded his
speeches for confidence, following coding and
content analysis methods developed by Margaret
Hermann. 2o Second, I coded the same speeches
for a lack of confidence using the same principles. I operationalized a lack of confidence
as use of the subjunctive verbal mood in nonconditional statements and use of plural firstperso~ personal pronouns when the actor is
discussing initiating action, his/her position of
authority, and receiving positive feedback. 2 1 The
third and final step was dividing each speech's
high confidence measure by its low confidence measure. This creates a ratio of high confidence to low confidence that captures the
highllow relationship.
My analysis reveals high confidence markers increasing more than low confidence markers
until the Nice referendum. Low confidence markers quickly outnumber high confidence markers
shortly thereafter. While content analysis is not a
perfect science, I am confident this measure is
roughly accurate of Ahern's confidence during this
period: the four speeches and one interview coded
were each well over 1,000 words, thus providing
sufficient material for an accurate coding.
As the graph below shows, confidence
reached its peak during the months immediately
preceding the Nice referendum debacle (and fell
thereafter):

Ahern's Co nfid ence Quor.ic nr
9
8
7
OJ
u 6
t:;
OJ
5
'"";j
''::: 4
c;
c 3
U 2
1
0
]",1 9IJ N(.y 9') ,\1:.1-(-011

J ~J-Illl

?-':.w·(lIj

MIIHlt

J ul ·

~~

Time
Figure 3. Measure of Ahern's confidence levels from early
1999

to

mid-2001

Previous victories in subjects unrelated to
the EU caused Ahern to overestimate his odds of
success on the Nice referendum. In the early part

JENNE]OHN

of 1999, Ahern was still weathering criticism and
grappling with persistent opposition regarding the
Good Friday Agreement-thus the relatively low
confidence levels. Upon final resolution of this
issue, a major victory for Ahern and his administration, Ahern's confidence steadily grew. In the
sense that Ahern's growing confidence can be
attributed to his watershed victory in the Northern Ireland peace process, and as such the result of
a "judgmental-evaluative process" (Vertzberger
1990, 128), Ahern's confidence can be categorized
within Vertzberger's definition of an attitude. The
relationship between the attitude of confidence
and the decision to not counteract the Nice opposition is causal: "[attitudes] create a disposition for
a particular pattern of behavior toward specific
objects or categories of objects and social situations or some combinations thereof' (Vertzberger
1990, 127-8). Thus, Ahern's confident attitude
prevented him from appropriately reacting to his
opposition. He misperceived his own efficacy and,
therefore, didn't take the proper steps to shore up
the support for Nice.
In Ahern's case, the sword cut twice. Not
only did Ahern overestimate his own position
but he also underestimated the position of his
opponents. Vertzberger describes the "insensitiviry to situational implications" evident in Ahern's
disregard for the Nice opposition as "the tendency to prefer dispositional explanations of the
other actors' behavior" (e.g., inherent weakness)
(Vertzberger 1990, 129). In other words, individuals choose to discount another actor on the
perception of the other's deficiency. As in
Vertzberger's example of Israel disregarding the
obviously imminent attack from the "weaker"
Arab states in the fall of 1973, Ahern and his
administration underestimated the opposition
because they considered their opponents as ideologically marginalized, intellectually inferior,
immoral, and illegitimate.
Statements from administration officials
indicate these four sources of "situational insensitivity." Ahern's Minister of Justice reveals the
perception of the opposition as intellectually
inferior and ideologically marginalized when
referring to the Green Party with the following,
"What can be said of this party whose policies
and attitudes regularly make good theatre of the

absurd?" (Irish Times 2001b) Perceived opposition immorality and illegitimacy is evidenced
through another administration official who
"described the No [to Nice] campaign as
'wrong'" (Irish Times 2001 b), and through the
Minister of the Environment who said that
the Sinn Fein "campaign was dishonest" (Irish
Times 2001a). Ahern himself referred to "No to
Nice" as "a sinister campaign of disinformation"
and called supporters of the "No" campaign the
"lunatic fringe" (de Breadun 2001). Thus, working within an attitude that perceived nonexistent
deficiencies in the opposition, Ahern and his
administration acted inappropriately to the reality they faced.
With Irish government structure and
culture concentrating the responsibility for
counter-acting the "No to Nice" campaign
in his hands, Bertie Ahern had only himself to
blame for the failure of Nice ratification. By
overestimating the efficacy of his administration
and underestimating the efficacy of his opposition, Ahern became his own worst enemy. In his
own words:
1, of course, am deeply disappointed by the Referen-

dum result. I am also disappointed that all of us on
the 'Yes' side, the Government, the main political
parties and the social partners were not able

to

per-

suade a higher number of voters to participate in
making such an important decision. (Ahern 2001)
RECAPITUlATION AND REFLECTION

The interplay of government structure, cultural preferences, and leadership personality provides the necessary and sufficient conditions
for decision-maker misperception in the Irish
case. Irish government structure and culture
concentrate decision-making authority in the
taoiseach by creating a group think environment
within the central decision-making body.
Although there are short power-distances and
little hierarchy in the Irish Cabinet, "pressures
towards uniformity" and institutional norms
grant the taoiseach sweeping autonomy. Irish
government structure and culture also elevate the
importance of personality in politics. Therefore,
the taoiseach has a proclivity for injecting his/her
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personality in politics, and his/her policy-making
autonomy provides the opportunity to do so.
Such personality injection is the precise
cause of the Administration's miscalculation
regarding the Nice referendum. Ahern's overconfidence in his own abilities and inaccurate attitudes
towards the Nice opposition led him to misperceive the situation. Without decision-making
power dispersed to other actors, that they might
challenge Ahern's interpretation and attendant
policy-prescription, this personal miscalculation
proved fatal to all on the "yes" side. Ahern had
both the ability and interest to defeat the "No to
Nice" campaign, but instead he inadvertently
allowed his opponents' victory.
The lessons provided by the Irish Nice
experience, especially when coupled with the
Danish Maastricht experience, are this article's
first intended contribution to the field. The Nice
experience shows that EU leaders cannot expect
to operate in a vacuum-if decision-makers neglect domestic interests, citizenries will impact EU
progress. Perhaps Nice's most important lesson is
that the "democratic deficit"22 murmured of for
so long is a reality, or at least perceived to be
among the electorate. EU policy-makers might
learn from Ireland that EU progress is feasible
not simply through direct, clear engagement
with the citizenry but also engagement that communicates interests up the hierarchy and not just
down. Vision, not just mud-slinging the opposition, must attend reform campaigns, especially
when the reforms do not promise more money.
Actor misperception, magnified by structural and cultural factors, provides my Nice
reversal explanation: my second intended contribution to the field of foreign policy analysis and
international political study. With this explanation, it is possible to discern whether this obstacle to EU enlargement is surmountable. My
explanation isn't a quick-fix like the "lack of
funds" explanation: simply throwing money at
this problem will not necessarily result in ratification. Yet, this explanation does allow for "yes"
correction. The Irish hurdle to enlargement is
surmountable, if the decision-making group,
principally Bertie Ahern, is able to correct the
previous misperception. Since failure is the primary impetus for change (Herman 1990, 10), it
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seems that this misperception, and thus Nice
ratification, will be corrected in time.
Third, this study contributes to European
political analysis, specifically to liberal intergovernmental theory. The politics of the Irish
Nice referendum provide an ideal case for further
understanding how states debate and configure
"national preferences," (Moravcsik 1993, 482,
and Moravcsik 1998, 24-7). National preference
formation is the first step in the intergovernmental model of EU negotiation and policymaking. Thus, the Irish experience allows us to
better understand and predict EU policy-making
by providing insight into this fundamental
process.
Arguing that "groups articulate preferences; governments aggregate them"(Moravcsik
1993,483), liberal intergovernmentalism identifies the formation of national preferences as the
launchpad for EU policy outcomes. National
preferences are crucial because nation-state governments, not supranational bureaucrats, are the
key decision-makers in EU policy-making. 21
Andrew Moravcsik, the leading intergovernmental theorist, outlines the intergovernmental
policy-making model as follows: 2 ;

Liberal Theories
(International demand for
outcomes)
Underlying societal fuaors:
pressure from domestic societal
actors as represented in political
instirutions

.-

t

CONFIGURATION
OF STATE
PREFERENCES

t

Intergovernmental
Theories
(International supply of
outcomes)
Underlying political fuaors:
intensity of national preferences; alternative coalitions;
available issue lin~oes

NATIONAL
PREFERENCE
FORMATION

.-

INTERSTATE
NEGOTIATION

t

OUTCOMES

The Irish Nice referendum experience falls
within the "configuration of state preferences"
step of the model, where domestic and elite
preferences mix. Moravcsik argues that the
principle-agent relationship between society and
govern- ment bounds this preference configuration (Moravcsik 1993, 483). Since "the primary interest of governments is to maintain
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themselves in office" and since "this requires the
support of a coalition of domestic voters, parties,
interest groups, and bureaucracies" (Moravcsik
1993.483), preference configuration is rational.
Domestic actors directly or indirectly pressure
the government for a certain foreign policy decision (e.g., refuse to ratify the Nice Treaty).25 The
government must respond to domestic pressure
in order to secure their office. "At times the
principal-agent relationship between social pressures and state policies is tight; at times, 'agency
slack' in the relationship permits rational governments to exercise greater policy discretion"
(Moravcsik 1993, 484), depending upon the
issues and actors involved.
The Irish Nice experience teaches us that
decision-maker perception of this principal-agent
relationship is crucial for determining the outcome ofEU policy. In its Nice policy, the Administration perceived more slack in the relationship
than actually existed. The government inaccurately aggregated the domestic interests and configured a national preference unacceptable to the
domestic polity. Domestic actors took two routes
to influence this unacceptable configuration:
some directly protested, or exercised "voice," and
voted against the ratifying referendum, others
indirectly influenced, exercising "exit," and simply refused to participate. 26 The policy-making
process broke down because one of the players
inadvertently failed to follow the rules.
The Nice referendum offers an obvious
caveat to Moravcsik's model: rational assumptions explain the configuration of state preferences only if state decision-makers do not
seriously misperceive the principal-agent relationship. However, the Irish lesson goes further,
and is therefore more meaningful, by offering
the key variables explaining this misperception.
By analyzing the impact of government structure, cultural preferences, and leadership personality in a given case, we can determine whether
this misperception exists.
Understanding this preference configuration process allows policy-makers to manage
more effectively and efficiently the changes EU
enlargement requires. Such management is not
only necessary in Ireland but also in all of the current transfer states. With the accession of the

Central and Eastern European countries, Spain,
Portugal, and Greece will lose the majority of
their EU transfer funds along with Ireland
(Economist 2001). While Irish economic growth
has lessened the importance of the funds to the
Irish, the rest of the "Poor Four" still rely heavily
on transfers. Spain provides a striking example.
Transfers to Spain in 1997 totaled 2,674.1 million Spanish pesetas (Scobie 1998, 37-8) or
35.94 million U.S. dollars. With the Spanish
government's 1998 expenditures budgeted at
18,139.6 million pesetas (Europa Publications
2000,3616) or 243.81 million U.S. dollars, this
transfer amounts to approximately 14.7% of the
total Spanish budget. 27 Eleven of Spain's seventeen regions receive transfer funds from the EU
(Economist 200 1). With stakes so high, configuring the domestic preferences in Spain will be as
important as it is difficult. Does the Spanish
administration correctly perceive the principleagent relationship on this issue? Is the perceived
democratic deficit too large for the currently constituted leadership to overcome? Can it effectively
manage this change? What role should the EU
play, if any, in this debate? Such questions can
be answered when intergovernmentalist theory
is applied with an understanding of the specific
government structure, cultural preferences,
and personality dynamics influencing Spanish
decision-making.
Thus, as they comprise one instrument in
a greater theoretical tool-belt, government structure, culture, and leadership personality provide
us with insight into both the Irish Nice refusal
and future European policy struggles.

Matthew C Jennejohn is a senior from Dousman,
Wisconsin, majoring in international politics. Following graduation, he plans on studying comparative law with an emphasis in European
jurisprudence.

NOTES
1. Only about 38% of the electorate turned out.

2. For a full description of the Nice Treaty, see European Union 200 1.
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3. Figures taken from the official European Union
website (European Union 2001).

4. For a brief treatment of Irish EU support and the

19. For a thorough discussion of how misperception
affects policy-making, see Jervis 1976.
20. For coding scheme design, see Hermann 1983;

causes behind it, see Butler and Castle 2001.

for content analysis methodology, see "Personaliry and

5. All of the five major parties in Ireland-Fianna
Hi!, Fine Gael, Labour, the Democratic Left, and the Pro-

Government" (Hermann 1984).

Foreign Policy Decision Making: A Study of 53 Heads of

gressive Democrats (which when combined control about

21. Coding the subjunctive in nonconditional state-

93% of the electorate -Whelan and Masterson 1998, 153)

ments is my own idea, as the subjunctive mood of verbs is

--openly supported Nice Treary ratification.

most often used when one is hedging or being overly polite

6. For instance, Sinn Fein and the Green Parry, the

if it is not used in a conditional. Coding the plural first-

only rwo parties opposing the Treary of Nice with represen-

person pronoun as low confidence is simply an adaptation

tatives in parliament, hold only three of the 166 seats in the

of Margaret Hermann's coding scheme for confidence. She

Diil (Laffan 2001,2).

codes high confidence as the use of the first-person pronoun

7. For description of the "yes" campaign's deficiencies, see Laffan 2001, 3-4.
8. Peel 2001 and Brennock 2001.

in the same situations (Hermann 1984).
22. For a scholarly discussion of the EU democratic
deficit and the debate surrounding it, see Lord 2001.

9. Liberal intergovernmentalism, championed by

23. The neofunctionalist school of thought asserts

Andrew Moravcsik, is "the most prominent and promising

that supranational actors, such as the European Commis-

rationalist account of the major turning points in the

sion, are the fundamental drivers behind EU policy-

history of European integration" (Schimmelfennig 2001,

making. For a discussion of neofunctionalism, its assumptions, origins, and explanatory purchase, see George 1994

47).
10. TO is the Irish equivalent of MP-Member of
Parliament.
11. Also contributing to the change, although at less

and Tranholm-Mikkelsen 1991. For the intergovernmentalist critique of neofunctionalism, see Moravcsik 1993,
474-80.

significant levels, were Ahern's relatively lower confidence

24. This model can be found in Moravcsik 1993, 482.

during the Amsterdam decision, the recent election, and the

25. Moravcsik asserts that direct and indirect pressure

far less controversial nature of the Treary of Amsterdam (all
the thorny issues were procrastinated until Nice).
12. For an insightful comparison of PR-STV with

has the same effect on governments (1993,484).
26. I use the terms voice and exit as found in Moravcsik 1993, 484; however, these terms were introduced by

other electoral systems, see Arend Lijphart's Patterns of

Hirschman (1970). The abysmally low voter turnout is a

Democracy (1999).

good example of the exit option used during the referendum.

13. Taken from Sinnott 1995, 107.
14. Hofstede's four cultural preference continua are

27. The author's calculation taken from figures found
in Scobie 1998, 38.

found in Geert Hofstede (1991) Cultures and Organizations: Software of the Mind (London: McGraw-Hill). The
selections cited here are taken from John Zurovchak's appli-
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